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Syria

Increased Middle East Intervention

In the past week Western nations have ramped up the intensity of their attacks on Da'esh, with France increasing its air strikes and David Cameron pledging to also strike Da'esh positions in Syria. Meanwhile, further gains have been made by resurgent Assad regime forces, backed by Russian air strikes.

Is the Western response the right move at this time - and is it strategically motivated, or an emotional response to the recent terror attacks? Will closer intervention in Syria lead to co-operation with Assad, or further tensions with his sponsors in Russia? Whatever your view, send it in - via Twitter, Facebook or our website. The contributors best insights will be invited to explore their views further for our journal Sir!

“Vers l’Orient compliqué, je volais avec des idées simples”

Jean-Baptiste Begat

This is a featured piece sent in response to our Focus of the Week. Keep an eye out for future topics and let us know your views!

On 30th September, the Russian Air Force led their first airstrikes in Syria, flying over the Turkish territory. These events took place only two months after the public backing of the highly controversial Turkish airstrikes in north-west Syria and south-east of Turkey by NATO’s General Secretary Stoltenberg. In what seems to be an escalation of involvement in the region between Russia and the western world, NATO announced the doubling of the size of its Response Force. These recent facts should not be interpreted through the only prism of history, specifically the resurgence of the so-called “bi-polar world” where the rest is the theatre of power struggle between the two main poles. Far from denying the impact of Russian recent involvement in the Iraqi-Syrian crisis on the conflictual relationship between Western countries and Russia, the international network of interest that is at stake in the ISIS crisis should be kept in mind. What are Putin’s goals in a massive Russian participation to the fight against the Islamic State ? Are these goals realistic, considering the Western geopolitical stances and interests in the region ? Do they form part of a long-term Russian political vision of stability in the area ?

Three main incentives may have caused Russia to become a protagonist in the war against ISIS. First of all, the recent Russian involvement in the Middle-East appears, in conventional wisdom, to be a matter of domestic policy for Putin. It is a historical cliché that governments which face difficulties in meeting domestic expectations tend to become hyperactive on the international stage, thus giving the impression that dealing with international emergencies is far more important than unemployment, demographic crisis and the economic recovery. The culturalist politico-historical point made by those who consider that Putin flatters Russian pride should not be neglected either. Historically, the geographical spectrum of Russian political influence has been only recently shrunk, and Putin’s propaganda is keen on asserting that the country of the Tsars must take on its historical responsibility and fight to protect Middle East minorities, just like it did under Catherine the Great or Stalin. Putin’s rhetoric to justify Russian involvement in Syria also successfully links the conflict in the Middle-East with terrorist attacks on the motherland. Such arguments are effective in convincing the Russian of the need for a deeper military involvement in the fight against ISIS, and they are also used by Western countries (see recent public speeches by the French Defence Minister Le Drian to justify new airstrikes in Syria). However, one should keep in mind that Russia does not seem a target of importance for terrorist attacks by ISIS propaganda, unlike France or the United States, for instance. Finally, there is Putin’s energy policy: the new Vienna agreement is leading to the massive entry of Iranian gas on the Western energy market, provoking an important devaluation of Russian oil. In that context, new primary sources of energy are sought by the Russians, especially with the Iraqi government and the Kurdish government of Barzani. But war is not good for business. 

Secondly, Putin’s policy in the Middle-East is also much of a regional one. Flying over Turkey was not a pilot navigational mistake; it was intended to be understood by the Turkish as a strong signal. Indeed, Turkey recently led airstrikes against the PKK (Kurdish autonomist political party, based in south-east Turkey, known for its use of violence and considered by most countries as a terrorist organisation) positions as well as against ISIS. However, the Kurds are one of Putin’s strongest allies in the Middle-East, for reasons bothhistoric - the father of Masoud Barzani, leader of the pre-eminent Kurdish party the KDP, found shelter in Moscow in 1946 after the failure of his coup d’état in Iraq - and military - the Kurdish Peshmerga are the only ground force efficient against ISIS in the north. Since the Russians cannot publicly back the Kurdish military effort without offending Iran (they only provide the Kurds with intelligence at the moment), which also has to deal with Kurdish secessionism in the north-west of the country, the only option left for Russia is to deliver a strong message directly to Turkey. Flying over its territories with warplanes is one way to do so.

Another regional incentive for Putin’s policy in the Middle-East is to woo Iran. Russia was particularly quiet during the diplomatic negotiations that led to the Vienna agreement, and now has the opportunity to show Iran that it doesn’t follow blindly the “international coalition” (the West), fighting ISIS its own way, just as Iran does by backing the Iraqi government, and could strengthen ties with Iran, whose supreme leader Ali Khamenei recently reminded that in spite of the agreement, Iranian international interests remained very different from those of Western countries. Add to this the fact that, by backing Bashar al-Assad, Putin supports the Shi’ite Alawi Syrian minority and you have all the reasons to believe in future rapprochement between Russia and Iran. 

Finally, the Russian fight against ISIS should also be interpreted in the broader context of international relations with the West. Many Cassandras have spoken and written about the rise of a new Russian imperialism, and even a “second Cold War”. Without going into these difficult prophetic exercises, Putin must have considered the big picture when he decided to fight actively and publicly against ISIS. Putin’s international policy – which reminds much of the Cold War “linkage” policy - should be seen as a whole, and a potential success of the Russian in their fight against ISIS would put the OSCE and NATO in a very difficult position when it comes to diplomatic negotiations about the Ukrainian “frozen conflict”. To a great extent, the Middle East question was one of the last productive diplomatic channels between the West and Russia. If Russia intervene its own way In Syria - and succeeds - the legitimacy which will be drawn from it may give him the possibility to cut that channel too. This is especially true if the West keeps on refusing any political solution in Syria that includes Bashar al-Assad, a man who made use of chemical weapons banned by international laws against his own people. 

Countries already committed to the fight against ISIS should wisely consider these two alternatives. From a diplomatic standpoint, it seems like there is little chance that Western countries will go along with the Russian proposal of fighting ISIS alongside with Assad. Most Eastern European countries are concerned by Russian expansionism in the West, and see in Russia the first threat to their national security. It would be difficult to imagine these same countries, who keep asking NATO for a more significant military presence, going along with the Russian Middle East policy. As for Western European countries, which are the most cautious ones regarding military operations in the international coalition, they are faced with the difficult choice between sticking to their first policy, finding a political consensus in Syria that excludes the dictator before leading any massive military operations, with the risk of waiting too long while the Russians take all the credit of potential military successes, or following the Russian policy, thus giving the diplomatic credit to Putin. These countries are also attached to international laws, under the light of which Putin’s intervention in Syria is on the very edge of legality (does help to self-defence apply to the Assad regime which clearly does not represent the Syrian people as a whole?). The same goes for American countries. Finally, it is very difficult to imagine Saudi Arabia – an important protagonist in the international coalition because of its military infrastructures and its proximity to the Iraqi-Syrian theatre - going along with Russia, considering its diplomatic proximity with Western countries and its rivalry with Iran. 

From a military standpoint, it is a bit too early to say whether the Russian backing of Bashar al-Assad (which, in concrete terms, means airstrikes, financial and logistical support, building of infrastructures and sending of non-fighting military troops) is actually efficient in the fight against ISIS. Doubts are reasonable though since the Russian should face the same difficulties the international coalitions met, namely a lack of intelligence, which should be the first step towards efficient targeting and successful military operations.  The only advantage the Russians may have on the international coalition is that they do not have to deal with the very difficult issue of coordination between several national air forces with their own command structures. 

The most important military concern, however, is to be found in the fact that a huge proportion of Russian airstrikes in Syria do not seem to aim at ISIS positions, but rather at the Syrian opposition. The United-Kingdom has recently announced that the British intelligence is currently working in order to identify what the Russian targets are. It is more than clear that Western countries cannot be part of a military coalition that fights the political opposition of an unwanted dictator. At the end of the day, the Russian policy may run counter to Russian interests; on top of accelerating the phenomenon of Syrian refugees who flee to Europe, these airstrikes are counterproductive since they help ISIS - whom the Syrian opposition to Bashar also fight. And if he does not get any military success quickly, Putin may wake the old Afghan trauma of the Russian people. Maybe he should read De Gaulle’s Mémoires de Guerre once more before going too hastily into the Middle East: “Vers l’Orient compliqué, je volais avec des idées simples”. 

The Enemy of My Enemy

WILLIAM YELDHAM

On November 6, 2014, the Reuters news agency reported an astonishing story. In October 2014, President Obama sent a secret letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressing that the two countries have a shared interest in fighting Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria. With Republican barks of 'Nuclear Iran' filling the senate and congress, this letter to a member of Bush's hyperbolic 'Axis of Evil,' has its roots in the Syrian Conflict.

The Syrian conflict is no longer a political struggle contained within the boundaries of one state, but a regional sectarian war. The refugee crisis that has followed in the wake of the conflict is not only straining the infrastructure and resources of neighbouring countries such as Jordan, but also, exacerbating existing tensions in host communities. There is on-going fighting between the Shia Alawite-led army of Assad, supported by the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah, and the broad spectrum of Sunni opposition, increasingly dominated by Islamist groups. The result is a territorial map that looks like a Jackson Pollock. However, on a broader geopolitical level the possible emergence of the 'Shia Crescent' has hardened hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran. King Abdullah and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's infamous friendly hug just in 2007 now seems long ago.

But how has the shifting agency of global powers US and Russia affected this? Despite the favourable election of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the U.S. has traditionally supported Saudi Arabia over Iran due to its long-standing alliance with Syria. However, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and its rapid, albeit erratic expansion has put the US between a rock and a hard place. Its options are limited: to continually oppose a potentially nuclear Iran or risk the territorial expansion of the ISIS.

The humanitarian cost of the crisis thus far has been enormous. Approximately 3 million people have fled Syria since the start of the conflict, most of them women and children, and neighbouring countries have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis.  In December 2013, the UN launched its largest appeal for a single crisis asking for £4 billion. However, the geopolitical ramifications of the conflict have been crystallized respectively in the Iranian and Saudi Arabian regional security strategies.

The first of these international actors is Iran. The country has been in favour of a centralized security approach in the Gulf, in contrast to Saudi Arabia who looks to external actors, particularly the United States, to guarantee its national and regional security. This crossover in terms of national interest plunges the entire region into a power game. Moreover, Iranian financial support to Shiite groups in Arab countries has increased tensions with Saudi Arabia, which in retaliation has lent support to  Iranian ethnic minorities in a bid to destabilize the Iranian regime.

International intervention in the conflict has not been restricted to these regional powers, and the actions of the US and Russia, have transformed it in some measure, into a proxy war. Although Russia has actively promoted the opening of the second Geneva meeting in order to gain initiative on the Syrian issue; it has also started to establish a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean.  Furthermore Russia has also moved its Asia pacific fleet to waters in the environs of Syria. Respectively the US has taken active steps to prepare for war, deploying the “patriot” missile defense system in Turkey and Jordan, carrying out large-scale joint military drills at the border of Jordan and Syria and increasing military support to the Syrian opposition.

However, the threat of Russian influence in the region has been far outdone by the rise of the ISIS. With as many as 1000 groups controlling 100,000 fighters, the ISIS is a self-funding, rapidly spreading threat to security in the region. Islamists and Jihadists whose tactics have caused rebel in fighting in the past, and fragmented the opposition to the Assad regime, now outnumber secular moderates. The ISIS has now taken control of huge swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria in spite of the efforts of US-led coalition airstrike beginning in September 2014.  Iran is a key part of this coalition and as such the power dynamics within US- Iran negotiations over nuclear power have shifted immensely.

Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), recently claimed that the “Americans are begging us for a deal on the negotiation table.” Indeed, such confidence is widespread within Iran and without. Saeed Ghasseminejad, an Iranian dissident and associate fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, stated

“Iran feels the administration needs the deal, and this belief is supported by the way the administration is acting.... Iran feels as long as the negotiation is going on, it has a green light to do whatever it wants in the region, so why should they bother to sign a deal?”

Yet, the truth is not quite as simple as this. Negotiations are still hampered by strong resistance to any compromise in both countries. Republican Senator Mark Kirk recently argued that “The Iranian terror state continues to show its true nature as it sidesteps the international sanctions regime during negotiations, and expands its threat into Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.” The deputy head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Hossein Salami, was also reported by the state-controlled Fars New Agency (FNA) as having stated that the country now has forces in Iraq, Syria and Yemen that are 10 times larger than that of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fear of neighbouring countries and Iran sceptics is that increased US-Iran relations will lead to a unipolar region as the deal they close will allow Iran to keep large amounts of its centrifuges running. Indeed, the Obama administration recently denied a report that said the President would agree to 80 percent of Iran’s demands in the ongoing nuclear talks. In light of Salami’s threats, the country that has most to lose by this is Israel. Israeli officials believe the deal would render Iran with the capability to reach nuclear “breakout capacity” almost imminently thus placing Israel in a very dangerous geopolitical and security position.

Will it last?

Despite the presence of the ISIS as a shared enemy, American and Iranian interests in Iraq are likely to diverge. The US, at least in principle, wants to see an inclusive democracy take root in Iraq, while Iran is focused on protecting Iraq’s Shia majority and religious shrines in a bid to bolster its position vis-a-vis the Saudis and other western-backed Sunni monarchies of the Gulf. Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at LSE recently questioned the durability of such an alliance in his comments -  “The Americans may think they have a coalescence of interests with Tehran, but that is a false hope. Iran’s policy has always been to sectarianize the conflict and back Shia chauvinism. That is the exact opposite of the outcome the Americans want – citizenship and equality for all before the Iraqi state.”

Problems in the US Coalition against ISIS?

Although the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Bahrain joined the coalition at the very outset, most observers believe their participation was more symbolic than active. Iraq has no air force to speak of and its army turned tail against forces of the ISIS; the Saudis allotted a trifling number of planes to the effort; while Bahrain doesn’t have an air force at all. The UAE has the biggest and most modern air force in the Gulf region and its suspension of bombings in early December was a major blow to Washington’s war effort. On Wednesday, 4th February 2015, US officials admitted that the UAE had suspended its air attacks in early December, directly after a Jordanian F-16 fighter aircraft was downed over the Syrian headquarters of the ISIS in Raqqa and its pilot Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was taken prisoner. However, hopes for the unity of the coalition were rekindled on the 7th of February, when Jordan’s Interior Minister Hussein al-Majali, said that Jordan will go after the ISIS and will “wipe them out completely.” Meanwhile there have been reports that UAE is sending F-16 fighter aircrafts to Jordan to aid the airstrikes. Rather than crippling the coalition as was initially feared, the capture and tragic death of Muath al-Kasasbeh has strengthened the resolve of the coalition. This was further evidenced by the march in Amman on the 6th of February in which protestors chanted “We are all Mouath…we are all Jordan,” as well as “Death to Daesh” – an derogatory Arabic acronym for the terror group. This bolstering of the coalition has for the moment somewhat curtailed Iran's bargaining power although it still remains an essential ally for the US if the latter wishes to maintain its chances of containing the threat of the ISIS.

What the Future holds?

Covert Alliance: Open disagreement

Despite the increasing involvement of Iran in the struggle against the ISIS, the Iranian denial that its planes had conducted air raids is categorical. A senior official similarly rebutted any suggestion that it is co-operating with the US in Iraq. “Iran has never been involved in any air strikes against Daesh (ISIS) targets in Iraq. Any co-operation in such strikes with America is also out of the question for Iran.” When recently asked in an interview on whether the United States would consider cooperating militarily with Iran, US Secretary of State John Kerry coyly replied, “Let’s see what Iran might or might not be willing to do before we start making any pronouncements.”

The alliance between the United States and Iran is essential in order to effectively restrict the expansion of the ISIS, however it could also potentially destabilize the region even further in the long term.  Only time will tell how well this affair of convenience will last.

 

 

 

 

Facing IS: At Best Buying Time?

KHALIL OSMAN

“Despite talk of military action, there was one thing we all agreed on: terrorism is resolved through politics and economics not through arms and intelligence, however important a role these play.” Those are the recollections of Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Director-General of MI5, of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. These thoughts are perhaps worth considering now more than ever. Firstly, consider arms and intelligence, and the important role that these play. Military action against the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, (they are ironically neither Islamic, nor a state), has so far proved successful in preventing their advances. US air strikes to assist the Peshmerga were pivotal in preventing IS from taking Erbil, as strikes to assist the Iraqi government were in preventing IS from seizing key Iraqi dams.

That said, at the time of publishing, reports are emerging from Syrian Kurds that air strikes are not actually working. One should take note of the mission creep that is now occurring, with US airstrikes being employed far beyond the scope of the initial objectives stated by President Obama on August 8. Those were specifically to help the fleeing Yazidis, and to protect the Kurdish people and US personnel in Erbil. Proponents would argue that nevertheless, the strikes to date have helped to contain the advance of IS. They have indeed played an important role. However, the idea that this makes them successful is a dangerously narrow way to judge success. In reality, there are a number of significant risks that arise from such strikes, even if they have physically restricted the advance of IS.

Terrorism is resolved through Politics and Economics

Let’s start with the blindingly obvious. Recent history has shown us that even the most advanced weapons technology does not eliminate collateral damage. In a 2013 report entitled “Will I Be Next?”, Amnesty International cites sources claiming that the US launched 330 to 374 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and September 2013. It says that according to these same sources, between 400 and 900 civilians were killed in these strikes, and at least 600 people were seriously injured. Human Rights Watch released a similar report, noting the civilian casualties arising from drone strikes in Yemen. Beyond the intrinsic harm of such damage, and that cannot be overstated, such casualties are instrumentally counterproductive to the pursuit of the objectives that are used to justify the strikes in the first place. In Pakistan, they have alienated local communities, fostered hatred, and ultimately act as a recruitment tool for the very groups that the strikes claim to target. Similarly, such casualties would foster the same resentment in Iraq, and act as a recruitment tool for IS. Reports have already suggested that IS fighters have moved themselves and their military assets into built up areas, surrounding themselves with the civilian population. We risk feeding into IS’s wider narrative. In the Commons debate on the issue last week, George Galloway warned against Britain and its allies “returning to the scene of their former crimes”.

Whatever one thinks of the rest of his speech, and indeed his wider views, this is undeniably a sentiment that is felt across the region. The Arabs are not unaware of their history. The state of Iraq was only demarcated by the League of Nations in 1920, before being placed under British mandatory control. The Arabs that fought an insurgency against the Ottomans during the First World War were encouraged to do so by the British, and were promised an independent state, free of British interference in return. They were, of course, betrayed, with the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French defining the division of the region between the two powers after the war. The post-war order in the Middle East, the nation states that exist, and the power blocs that have since controlled them, can be traced back to the heavy influence of the then colonial powers. Also note the proliferation of Al- Qaeda in Iraq that occurred precisely because of the 2003 invasion. Bombing Iraq again risks making Britain less safe (again). What about the presence of the Gulf states and the Iraqi government in the coalition? Iraqis know that the Gulf states are closely allied to the West, and this further feeds into the IS narrative of overhauling the existing order. As for the Iraqi government, it is unrealistic to expect Iraqi Sunnis to immediately support it after years of marginalisation at its hands. This will take time, and ultimately, it requires politics, the only real solution. That is not to mention the Syrian, Turkish and Iranian dilemmas. Syria has not been included, Turkey is wary of arming the Kurds, and Iran has refused to militarily cooperate. A failure to tackle these dilemmas may present insurmountable challenges to the success of any military action.

ACUTE HISTORICAL AMNESIA

Nevertheless, bombing will inevitably continue and escalate, now with UK involvement. But despite what the likes of Senator John McCain will have you believe, the idea that military action will actually defeat IS and solve this problem is pure fantasy. It represents the short-term horizon, acute historical amnesia and complete lack of understanding of the complexities of Middle Eastern politics that have crept into foreign policy. If military action now plays out as planned, and that is a big if, it will only weaken IS for a period of time, and not defeat them. In addition, bombing risks making the problem even worse. Our leaders realise that something needs to be done, but in the absence of a coherent strategy, have reverted to bombing. Our armed forces are being asked to do something that is perhaps counterproductive, presumably to make us feel better. There are, of course, other ways to combat IS. Former British military officer Frank Ledwidge notes that “Nothing would better fit their [IS’s] agenda of recruiting Sunni sentiment and active support than to have western bombers overhead and Shia soldiers in front of them.” He instead suggests “intelligent, effective covert action, and I have no doubt this has begun.” In effect, he proposes UK military action, but not bombing. Ledwidge wants Britain to be involved militarily, but only in a covert manner, thus not feeding into the IS narrative. Perhaps this is wiser, but again, it can only buy time.

BEYOND ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE

It is this said period of time that must be used wisely. In order to truly challenge IS, we must move beyond a reactive, knee-jerk foreign policy that consists overwhelmingly in arms and intelligence, and develop a longer-term view to engage in the political and economic spheres that Baroness Manningham-Buller speaks of. The common denominator of the states where such fundamentalism truly takes hold is poor governance and a broken state and/or society. Indeed, IS were given the opportunity to take hold in Iraq by the incompetence, corruption and sectarianism of Prime Minister Maliki and his government.

So what is the truly effective solution in states such as Iraq? As John Simpson puts it: “It may not be easy, but it is abundantly clear… The only serious answer is to turn them back into real countries once again.” He suggests pressure for good government, carefully targeted aid, counter-terrorism assistance, and military training. This is indeed something that the UK can influence. In 2012, Britain reportedly gave £86.8 million to Somalia, and £200 million to Afghanistan, ranked first and third in Transparency International’s list of the most corrupt nations respectively, and both countries where fundamentalism has taken hold. In a similar spirit, the UK should use its influence to ensure that its considerably close allies in the Gulf clamp down on the private individuals that are funding groups like IS. These are but a few tangible policies that the UK can pursue to take on IS. More specifically to Iraq, a political alternative has to be provided to the areas where IS has taken hold. This involves stopping the marginalisation of the Sunnis that occurred under Maliki. The idea of local Sunni units to police Sunni areas, and Shia units to police Shia areas, all part of a unified national guard, has been tabled. Perhaps that may be a start. More fundamentally, Iraq needs more federalism. It is through such a system that sectarian and tribal grievances can be properly addressed, and the wealth of the nation can be shared. It provides a channel through which local issues can be managed and controlled.

IS must be defeated by intelligent, effective, covert action

Ultimately, one must ask the question of what drives people into such violence. Political institutions that can deal with the root issues will prevent marginalised citizens being attracted to, and forced into violence. Such an approach involves long-term engagement and commitment in Iraq and elsewhere, and that is how we must really do battle. Whether we like it or not, military action will, at the very best, only buy time. More realistically, it may lead to dire consequences, and simply add fuel to the fire. The key is politics to challenge the root causes. There is no doubt that the phenomenon that IS represents must be tackled, and Britain can play a role. But if there is one thing that we can be certain of, one thing that history has repeatedly taught us, it is that the nuanced challenges posed by the Middle East cannot be solved militarily. It is worth summoning Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity: “doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.” Westminster, take heed.