Time to Engage: The United Nations Human Rights Council

AMELIA COOPER 

As students of Oxford approach the final weeks of term, some taut faced as they look towards their examinations, others lucky enough to have cast off their Sub Fusc to lounge on college lawns, human rights experts, delegates and civil society actors will convene in Geneva for the 29th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

The Council is the principal human rights body of the United Nations, composed of 47 member states responsible for the promotion and protection of international human rights, with other states sitting as observers. The Council’s work is enhanced by engagement with civil society organizations, experts, and academics. Convening three times a year for regular sessions, and at numerous points to respond to crises, the Council is a forum for the development of new resolutions, legislation and norms that form the foundations of the international human rights framework. It provides opportunities for thematic and country-specific discussion, with the intention of serving as, in UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s words, ‘a springboard for action’. Each session takes a slightly different focus: at each session, various reports are delivered by Special Rapporteurs, while interactive dialogue panels are held with experts. Furthermore, countries come under review at every session, both formally and informally. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a process under which the human rights records of UN member states are subjected to scrutiny by their peers, who offer recommendations as to how the situation may be improved. Heralded as one of the best and most practical mechanisms of the Council, the UPR is central to state accountability. On an informal level, innumerable speeches are made which draw attention to specific instances of concern in many countries.

However, the work of the Council is imperfect, and the good intentions of key actors are often frustrated by a lack of will or commitment from States. As Rosa Freedman, an eminent academic specializing in the UN and international human rights law, notes, ‘when we talk of the UN, we are talking about the collective will of its members’. One need only look to the gulf between the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its concomitant binding agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the ground-level reality of violations and abuse throughout the world to see that there is much to be done. This extends even to the increasingly politicized Council, where resolutions and declarations are often obfuscated for strategic purposes.

Redressing such a disparity is a daunting task; however, engagement with the Council is a key area in which we can all play a role. Taking note of the what goes on within the Council, from resolution debates to speeches made by civil society actors and States, is an essential step in ensuring the countries are held to account for the statements and commitments (both positive and negative) that they make. Currently, a dearth of coverage and interest has leant States a feeling of near impunity, allowing them to act in a reprehensible manner without fear of condemnation. What happens at the Council is of fundamental significance in shaping the international human rights framework: it affects us all.

The June session, opening this Monday, has a packed and varied agenda, encompassing issues from migrants’ rights to counter-terrorism, education to summary executions, and UPR outcomes for fourteen countries. Providing a coherent summary of the agenda is impossible; however, it can be accessed online here. Notable is the attendance of the new Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, David A. Kaye, who will deliver his first report, focusing on data privacy and encryption. Given the rumoured revival of the Snooper’s Charter and Cameron’s apparent disregard for the value of anonymity and privacy online, this is something that British citizens should be particularly engaged with.

Wherever your interests lie, it is clear that human rights are an increasingly prominent dimension of international relations and the happenings within the Human Rights Council require close attention. Perhaps the best sources of information are the civil society groups that attend: deeply engaged with the work that takes place, yet removed from the political games that are played by States, they have a unique ability to see – and show – the Council’s inner machinations. In that vein, I would encourage readers to engage with the Council via social media (civil society groups and most delegations have Twitter, Facebook etc.), to blog and talk about what is happening in Geneva, and to hold your governments to account to ensure that the Council retains its legitimacy and accountability, such that it can serve as the springboard that it was intended to be.

These twitter accounts may be of interest to readers:

All human rights, follow @fidh_un @fidh_en @ishrglobal @philippe_dam @nico_agostini @hrw @FreedomHouseDC

Freedom of expression, @article19un @indexcensorship @_SejalParmar 

Freedom of assembly and association and the protection of human rights defenders, @CIVICUSalliance @panafricannet

Freedom of religion or belief, @BHAhumanists @AmeliaCCooper @elizabethocasey @iheu @center4inquiry @mdedora @CSWEurope @RNS @brianpellot

Securing equal access to human rights for LGBTQIA, @ARCint1 @HRC

Disclaimer: This is by no means an exhaustive list, and is reflective of the author’s interests and bias.

The New Pacific Climate

Will China continue to accept the US-built liberal economic order while continuously pushing for a larger share?

Justin Chock in SIR Trinity term 2015

Recent Chinese construction of airstrips and artificial islands, alongside the possibility of American patrols contesting these projects, are giving new life to the “China-threat” and “power-transition war” schools in academic international relations. The current Sino-American relationship looks tense, but does this mean that conflict is on the horizon? The wide view of the relationship suggests not; instead the 2030 trans-Pacific dynamic looks to be a competitive, but peaceful, sharing of power. Indeed, while in the short-term we are still testing the stormy waters of a ‘new style’ of superpower relations, these tempests will eventually calm without conflict to form a dynamic of shared power within Asia.

In the worst-case scenario, however, the US and China will view their relationship as a zero-sum competition of strength, and thus if conflict breaks out, it will be under this dangerous mind-set. The following analysis examines this assumption, focusing firstly on the military dimension as the primary source of conflict, followed by an analysis of likely economic conflict, and lastly a consideration of their respective soft power capabilities. All three ultimately represent potential areas of conflict that could devolve into a military struggle; fortunately the most likely outcomes in all three areas feature only peaceful competition.

The 2030 trans-Pacific dynamic looks to be a competitive, but peaceful, sharing of power

Firstly, from a military perspective, the US has and will have an absolute advantage in terms of defence capabilities. Numerous reports underscore the fundamental problems in the ranks of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), such as endemic corruption, an overcomplicated and inefficient organizational structure, and operational inexperience. Many cite China’s rising defence spending as evidence of future growth in its armed forces, but as Professor Peter Robertson notes, the increasing economic prosperity in China is paradoxically making purchases more expensive: since the military budget hovers at around 2% of GDP, the absolute increases in military spending, with price increases taken into account, provide approximately the same purchasing power and thus capabilities. Consequently, projecting a relatively unchanging military power gap, the US – not to mention its numerous Asia-Pacific allies – will safely maintain a military advantage from now through to 2030. This unchanging inequality is something that the PLA would not reasonably want to challenge challenge due to the low likelihood of success.

The US, on the other hand, recognizes that its commitments across the world are spreading its forces worryingly thin. Should a limited conflict arise within the Asia-Pacific region, China would have the regional upper hand due to its greater concentration of forces in the area. This is largely due to China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) methods, designed to exclude an opponent’s forces from a specific territory or deny those forces the ability to use or transit resources. Such a strategy is primarily defensive, and would not escalate the conflict as much as the likely US counter of its Air Sea Battle strategy. Due to the overwhelming force needed to neutralize A2AD sites deep within Chinese territory and behind layers of defensive forces, any such counter would likely usher in a full-scale war. So playing out both strategies shows that the US understands that excessive provocations could quickly force the other side to enact a strategy that leads to war.

China and the US are beginning to build trust, and inter-military cooperation is actually on the rise

The fact that this downward spiral rests on a hairpin trigger is precisely why America shares China’s hesitance about initiating hostilities. Last November’s pledges to establish official inter-military notification mechanisms are a recognition of the volatility of the situation, and represent concrete steps from both sides taken to avoid any escalation. Indeed, the ongoing ‘pivot to Asia’ will cause the two nations to come into even more contact and thus more friction between them is likely in East Asia. Viewed through this lens, assertive measures like island-building in the South China Sea are short-term, calculated ways to push the competition forward that have been determined not to be detrimental to the underlying peace, and so measures like this will continue through 2030 without large-scale battles surrounding them.

As the notification mechanisms demonstrate, China and the US are beginning to build mutual trust, and inter-military cooperation is actually on the rise. The 2014 Rim of the Pacific military exercises demonstrated a historic moment in this regard, as this was the first time the PLA Navy participated in the world’s largest international maritime exercise. Although some criticized China for including an uninvited intelligence collection ship, US Pacific Commander Admiral Locklear noted that China is in fact acting under the international norm that permits military and surveillance operations within a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone. China is not revising global norms as the ‘China-Threat’ school believes, but instead is beginning to exploit them to serve its own rational interests.

China is not revising global norms but instead is beginning to exploit them to serve its own rational interests

On the second front, although military issues are the greatest predictor of conflict, economic considerations reinforce the future vision of competitive power-sharing. Speculating upon China’s future economic growth has proved notoriously difficult. Answers range from the Chinese economy overtaking the US within the decade to never coming close. However, what is certain is that China is leveraging its growing economy, and the recent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AAIB) is one way that the country is challenging the American-built system, which includes the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank.

However, the AIIB’s purpose is to provide infrastructure investments to only the Asian region and thus serves as a way for China to focus on consolidating local influence while continuing to let other organizations uphold the global economic system elsewhere. China benefits greatly from economic flows under the current system, but the nation does want a larger influence within the global economic structure, thereby making the economic climate by 2030 likely to be similar to the military one; namely limited competition that does not upset the overall order.

China benefits too greatly from economic flows under the current system – but the country does want a larger share of the global economic structure

Finally, while the US retains a vast amount of soft power, China’s attractive power seems to be growing. For example, the AIIB attracted many US-aligned states like the UK, Germany, and South Korea against American wishes, challenging the prevailing assumption of full American cooperation with these countries. Furthermore, the quickening rapprochement of the India-China relationship, combined with strengthening ties with Russia, demonstrates the increasing degree to which China is able to attract and deepen its partnerships, which could be seen as a balance against regional and global US alliances.

Nevertheless, these measures continue to pale in comparison to the global network that the US has formed: over 60 security partner nations, integration within the leadership of numerous major international institutions, and the American-led spread of liberal democratic ideals. As Professor Joseph Nye has argued, soft power is not necessarily zero-sum: although China may increase its global attractiveness, this may serve to reduce the likelihood of conflict as both countries become more attractive in each other’s eyes. Yet the future of Chinese soft power appears to be on a similar trajectory of a strengthening China that will begin to push back and hold its own, but not upset the overall dominance of America’s global brand.

Even from a hard-line zero-sum perspective on the relationship, time is on the side of a peaceful relationship between China and the US. Indeed, a continuation of competitive peace could play out in either of their favours. The US is waiting for China’s economic slowdown to lag behind the accelerating pace of the American economic recovery, or the possibility of liberal democratic ideals taking hold within China itself. China, for its part, will wait to allow its GDP growth to slowly push its global position past America’s, whilst hoping to quell its numerous domestic problems, thereby allowing the nation more power and a larger role on the world stage. Both scenarios require the maintenance of peaceful relations due to their economies relying so heavily on each other and their respective surrounding nations. Open conflict would swiftly cut all of those ties and undermine the long-term economic policies of both countries.

Consequently both sides have an impetus to prevent conflict with one another, while still pushing their own agendas as far as is compatible with this goal. The Sino-American relationship is too tense for a formalized alliance, but not tense enough for conflict. The middle ground lies therefore in an informal sharing of power that both sides have a stake in upholding. However, competition always has the potential to escalate out of control, and it will be up to these two superpowers to remain vigilant in their relations as they chart a shared path through choppy Pacific waters.

For Want of a Nail: British Defence Policy in 2030

Britain must spend more, and more wisely, in order to have any hope of clinging to a role on the world stage

Alfie Shaw in SIR Trinity term 2015

The period since 2000 has seen the most rapid physical and moral disarmament in the UK since the 1930s. If Britain is to maintain her position in the turbulent global order, this cannot continue. British defence policy has been characterised by underinvestment, antiquated doctrine, and disastrous procurement decision-making. Operational success and failure must be redefined, strategy and doctrine updated, and procurement practices improved. This article will illustrate how defence policy has been deficient, frame it in terms of a wider foreign affairs strategy, and explain how this vision can become a reality.

The branches of the defence trinity famously conceptualized by Carl von Clausewitz were the state, the people, and the military. The past fifteen years has seen a decline in public willingness to support, and in state willingness to fund, overseas deployments; this, coupled with the proliferation of a ‘garrison state’ frame of mind, whereby Britain can isolate herself from foreign affairs, has led to the decline of Britain’s military capabilities.

Over the course of recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, successive governments have recognized a rise in casualty weariness amongst the public that hinders operational effectiveness. This sensitivity to the human cost of war has led to moral disarmament, in the form of a decline in public support for defence spending and for overseas engagements. Meanwhile, an isolationist frame of mind has spread throughout government and amongst the public, reducing the perceived necessity to spend on defence. This phenomenon has come at the very time that governments have adopted an ideological commitment to a smaller state and fiscal conservatism, meaning that the Ministry of Defence has become a preferred target for cuts, resulting in a process of rapid physical disarmament.

An isolationist frame of mind has spread throughout government and amongst the public

Inverting Clausewitz, politics has had to become war by other means. Between 2010 and 2015, defence spending declined by 14% in real terms; since 2007, troop numbers have declined by 19%, and are forecast to have slumped 27% by 2020.  The Royal Navy’s stock has declined by 50% to only 18 warships, and one need look no further than the current air campaign in Iraq to see the decline in Britain’s air power: whereas Britain now fields only eight fighting aircraft, she deployed over 140 in 1991. This must change if Britain is to maintain her position as middle power in the global order.

Britain’s primary source of security is the maintenance of a rules-based world order. This means defending the integrity of sovereign states and maintaining stability wherever possible, employing multilateral institutions and alliances to do so. This strategy cannot be achieved through isolationism.

There are two viable ways to achieve this aim, and both demand effective defence policy. The first is to revive the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, which has long been the guarantor of the security of global order and will remain so for the near future. It has lapsed as a result of British moral and physical disarmament: America now looks to Germany as its diplomatic partner in Europe, and to France as its primary military ally. Britain, by contrast, has been relegated to an intelligence and security partner.  This is no surprise: France has recently shown greater willingness to engage overseas than has Britain, while Germany has greater influence in the European Union. The second is to strengthen ties with multilateral institutions, primarily NATO and the UN, in order to ensure that the rules-based world order is maintained, and that Britain maintains the ability to influence multilateral policy for its best interests. Both of these courses of action require increased, and more effective, defence engagement, which in turn requires a revision of British defence policy.

British defence policy must recognise that the perception of success and failure is often, in non-existential conflicts, more important than the military reality of victory and defeat. Commanders should engage with the narrative as reported by the media when forming strategy. This should be achieved through integrated action: broad-spectrum warfare involving the militarisation of the media, where the desired effect on the broad ‘audience’ (including, but not limited to, the enemy) is the aim, and it is achieved with minimal risk of loss. Commanders may no longer consider only the operational theatre: battles are not now won and lost merely in the war zone, but in the media, on the home front, and in multilateral institutions.

Britain must spend more – and more smartly   

Strategy must reflect the fact that success is not achieved solely on the basis of an army’s independent ability to defeat a foe in conventional full-spectrum warfare. Readiness can amount to engagement, and defence policy should reflect this. Britain should pursue a strategy of persistent engagement: deploying troops in small numbers, or even as individual attachés, during peacetime, so that insight, understanding and interoperability are developed, maintained, and communicated.  The success of the French intervention in Mali, for example, may be attributed largely to persistent engagement and cultural intelligence.

The maintenance of a rules-based world order may be achieved by the communication of deterrence to potential disruptors of that order, which, in turn, requires military exercises. Since 2013, Russia has launched nine large-scale military exercises, in which the average number of troops involved was 82,000, and the maximum was 160,000. By contrast, the largest NATO exercise involved 6,000 troops. Britain currently only exercises at divisional level on a paper basis, fostering international doubt that Britain could feasibly field a divisional force. Future defence strategy must aim to communicate viable deterrence in order to increase the perceived cost of challenging the established world order.

Despite the need for greater engagement and more active military exercises, policy need not aim to maintain a full spectrum independent fighting capability; rather, it should be geared towards interoperability and international coalitions, without abrogating key decision-making responsibility. In practical terms, this means avoiding expensive vanity projects such as aircraft carriers and maintaining only those resources that represent a viable capability against conceivable opponents. Defence procurement practices should reflect this.

Britain’s primary source of security is the maintenance of a rules-based world order

The question of quality in defence procurement is one that has led to catastrophic spending errors. Britain sold 72 Harrier fighter jets to the USA for $180m in 2011 in anticipation of the delivery of a fleet of stealth F35 Joint Strike Fighters the next year. None came, and the cost exploded: today, Britain has yet to receive a single fighter, and the cost of each aircraft has risen from £33m to £87m, not far shy of the cost of all 72 Harriers. These aircraft are simply too advanced and expensive for the role that Britain requires, which is extremely unlikely to be dogfighting a superpower with stealth fighter capability. Britain must recognize that her place in the world is not that of a superpower, but of a middle-rank power, and must adopt defence procurement practices to suit.

Britain is a middle-rank power with a declining influence on the global stage, a result of perilously low defence spending over the last fifteen years and reluctance on the part of the British people and governments to accept a greater role for the country in the word. Britain must spend more, and more smartly, on defence in order to punch at her weight on the world stage; she must revive old alliances and maintain those she has, and she must engage overseas in times of peace as in times of war, refusing to turn her back on the world if she is to maintain what is left of her global influence.

What Comes Up Must Come Down

States are grappling with falling populations all around the world

Natan Bram in SIR Trinity term 2015

For nearly 200 years, the dominant demographic story of the world has been that of rising populations. In 1800 the global population was around 1 billion; by 1900 it had reached over 1.5 billion, and by 2000 it was over 6 billion. For a long time, many scholars and commentators have been gripped with a Malthusian fear of population exceeding resources, leaving global shortages of food, water and energy. However there is another very different, but equally significant, demographic story emerging: that of declining populations. Such falls are not primarily because of disease, famine or war but because fertility rates are falling below replacement rates across large parts of the world. According to a UN Populations Division Report in 2012, nearly 48% of people live in countries where the fertility rate is below the replacement level – an average of 2.1 children per female in her lifetime. This article will explore three different types of countries where population is falling and predict how the situation will unfold by 2030.

Germany is a paradigmatic example of the first type of country. It is prosperous, the death rate is low, and net inward migration is in the hundreds of thousands a year. Yet the population is slowly falling as the birth rate remains stubbornly low; women are choosing to have fewer children later in life as they attempt to balance careers and motherhood. Indeed, fertility rates across the West (and Japan) are below the replacement rate, from as low as 1.3 in Spain in 2013, 1.8 in Belgium and 1.9 in the United Kingdom. So what does 2030 look like for Germany, and similar counties in the West? It seems unlikely that in the next fifteen years birth rates will recover or that countries will accept the high levels of immigration that would see populations stabilise and grow.  

Populations in Western nations will decline and governments will simply have to find ways to adapt to this

Firstly, the popular and political backlash against immigration is strong across many countries suffering from low fertility rates. The recent success of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany is representative of broader electoral successes for anti-immigrant parties across Europe in recent years. In addition, immigrants would need to move to areas suffering worst from depopulation if they are going to best fill the labour gap left by a fall in the working age population. However, it is often precisely these areas - such as the old East Germany - where levels of diversity are currently low and accommodating high numbers of immigrants will be socially difficult. 

Secondly, it is unlikely that birth rates will rise to the replacement level; this would require huge social and cultural change or a seismic event such as the Second World War which triggered a baby boom at the war’s conclusion. Germany has for years attempted to increase birth rates, with tax breaks for married couples and allowances for stay-at-home mothers, but with little success. It seems difficult to imagine that a shift in attitudes towards family size will happen in the next fifteen years.

Instead, by 2030, we will likely see Germany and other Western countries simply adapt to falling populations. Already local authorities are merging in order to provide services to a smaller and more spread out population at a lower cost. The retirement age in many European countries has slowly increased over the last few years, despite fierce political battles, and will likely continue to do so over the next fifteen years. Immigration or higher birth rates will not come to the rescue of western nations by 2030: populations will decline and governments will simply have to find ways to adapt to this.

A second set of countries, the Pacific Islands, are facing a very different depopulation story. Though not a uniform trend across the Pacific Islands, several of these small islands nations are facing striking declines in population. Self-governing Niue, for example, has seen its population fall from over 5,000 in the 1960s to less than 1,600 today. The population of the Cook Islands has similarly fallen from a peak of over 20,000 in the 1970s to less than 14,000 today. Unlike in Germany or Spain, the issue here is not about falling birth rates: there is a natural increase in the population of the Cook Islands. Instead it is all about migration. Cheap transport and historical connections to Australia and New Zealand facilitated mass migration to these labour hungry nations from the middle of the twentieth century. Furthermore, modern communications allowed people to move away and take advantage of the greater opportunities in large developed nations, without losing contact with friends and relatives back home.

Although technology facilitated the mass exodus of the past half-century, it may paradoxically prove to be a saviour by 2030

However, although technology facilitated the mass exodus of the past half-century, it may prove paradoxically to be a saviour by 2030. Internet communication will mean that people can stay on the islands without being isolated from the world – in 2003 Niue became the world’s first country to offer all its citizens free Wi-Fi. The Internet may also be able to stimulate the tourism industry in some of these more remote islands. Places like the Cooks Islands and Niue will struggle into 2030 but modern technology may help them remain viable polities.

The final set of countries that are suffering from falling populations are states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. To a degree, they combine the problems of both Western nations such as Germany, and the Pacific Islands. Moldova epitomizes this: its fertility rate in 2012 was less than 1.5, well below the replacement rate. Moreover, scores of young people leave every year for Russia, Western Europe and the US – it is estimated that between 600,000-1,000,000 Moldovans work abroad, many of them illegally. In addition, Moldova, Russia, Belarus and others also have significantly higher death rates than in Western Europe putting, further pressure on the population. Moldova’s population has fallen from around 4.3 million in 1990, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, to around 3.6 million today. The emigrants do provide remittances that are crucial to the Moldovan economy, but with so many young people emigrating, the dependency ratio becomes problematically high and chronic skill shortages throttle the economy.

More than in Western Europe or the Pacific Islands, government action could turn the population story around. If places like Russia and Moldova can achieve long-term economic growth, a stable political climate, and enhanced public services, then migration will likely be stemmed, the birth rate may well increase as young people feel more secure, and the death rate would fall as health care improved. However, the deep-seated nature of the economic and governance problems in places like Moldova and Russia means significant progress is unlikely to be made by 2030; instead their populations will continue to fall – though the pace of that fall can be mitigated by committed and sensible government action.

The deep-seated nature of the economic and governance problems in places like Russia means significant progress is unlikely to be made

Just as with population growth, declining populations present both challenges and opportunities for countries. A falling population means fewer dependent children for the state to provide services for, and less pressure on the natural resources of a country.  However, it also presents deep challenges of how to provide the same level of services with a smaller tax base, as the number of working age people decline. The specific problems and solutions faced by countries with falling populations depends on the reasons for the population decline. It is unlikely that, by 2030, governments will have really faced up to the problems they are facing; while for many countries like Russia and Moldova, falling populations are a symptom of wider governmental failure.

War By Other Means: The Coalition Strategy Needed To Defeat ISIS

Alfie Shaw

“Our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy”, President Obama announced in September last year. Islamic State (IS) will not, however, be degraded beyond its current state, let alone destroyed, by the ‘comprehensive strategy’ that the US-led coalition is employing. It is a strategy that seeks to use military means to establish a political solution, when it ought to seek directly political outcomes.

The primary reason for this failure is that the coalition is using the wrong strategy. It is fighting a counter-terrorism operation based on the logic of the Afghanistan campaign, rather than recognising that IS is not a terrorist group, but a pseudo-state. Unlike Al-Qaeda, which recruited based on ideology, IS attracts fighters through the territorial prestige of the Caliphate, and the faux-Islamic legitimacy that it confers. Undermining this attraction requires the reclamation of IS territory, which air strikes alone cannot deliver.

The air campaign, which will soon be a year old, has neither halted the advance of IS nor dealt it critical damage. Only days ago, IS captured Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar province, and has continued to menace Syria, recently reaching Palmyra. This is partly because the air campaign has been desultory, especially relative to recent conflicts: in the 75 days following October 7th, 2001, the USA alone dropped 17,500 munitions on 6,500 combat sorties in Afghanistan; over the 76 days since August 8th, 2014, the coalition made only 632 strikes, using only 1,700 munitions, in both Iraq and Syria.

The coalition has pointed to the neutralisation of high-profile targets such as Abu-Sayyaf, the alleged leader of Islamic State’s oil business, as effective leadership decapitation, but this is not the case. Unlike Al-Qaeda, IS has a deep leadership structure packed with former members of Saddam’s armed forces. As individuals that the US presents as ‘top officials’ are killed, others will step up to replace them.

The Islamic State will be defeated by political and ideological operations in which the military play a part, not the other way around. The problem must be approached at its political source: in Iraq, the driver of support for IS is the widespread marginalisation of Sunnis, and in Syria it is the political vacuum left by the Assad regime. The problem should similarly be approached at its geographical source: their Syrian heartland and Raqqa, the Caliphate’s self-proclaimed ‘capital’.

A political resolution starts with the deposition of Bashar Al-Assad. Removing Assad need not require explicit coalition involvement. Rather, the imposition of a no-fly zone in Syria would aid opposition forces, finally allowing them, with the benefit of coalition training and weapons, to defeat Assad. Deposing Assad would achieve dual aims. First, it would undermine Sunni fears that the coalition is secretly in favour of maintaining Assad, serving to reduce Syrian Sunni support for IS. Secondly, demonstrable commitment to deposing Assad would end Turkey’s excuse for inactivity, strengthening the coalition. As Turkey joins the coalition and the United States asserts the force of its will, the incentive for Gulf States to increase their contribution will grow and Arab leaders will be seen to take the lead, legitimising the coalition. With Turkey and the Gulf States on side, the influx of foreign fighters and transit of saleable antiquities through Turkey would be reduced, as would donations to IS from Gulf individuals. 

Assad’s removal would reduce tensions between the coalition and the troops that it is training. The coalition seeks to use its trainees effectively as mercenaries against IS, whereas in most cases their primary aim is the deposition of Assad. Once he is gone and a new government has been established in Syria, attention may be directed at IS. However, the formation of a new government requires coalition strategy to operate at a geopolitical level.

It is unthinkable that the post-Assad settlement should involve the installation of a new government followed by a return to the status quo ante bellum. Syria will not maintain its geopolitical integrity, and coalition strategy should reflect this reality in order to focus as soon as possible on defeating IS. The idea of two independent Kurdish states should be considered rather than ignored. This geopolitical strategy should similarly be employed in Iraq. Sunni support for IS stems from perceived abuse by the Shia-majority. The replacement of the evidently abusive Iraqi president Nouri al-Maliki with Haider al-Abadi has failed to redress this perception, and so the coalition should compel the Iraqi government to go further and grant Sunni dominated regions such as Anbar federal autonomy after the Kurdish model that is already employed. Greater state homogeneity will increase coalition willingness and ability to train Iraqi forces, while reducing support for IS.

This strategy is clearly a long-term one. It will be years before a stable government can take root in place of Assad and training of a new army can begin. Similarly, it will be a long time before the Iraqi army or the moderate Syrian opposition are sufficiently trained and equipped to defeat IS. The process should not be rushed. The Iraqi army, especially, should not be pushed into taking the fight to IS before it can be confident of victory: after its morale-crushing defeat at Mosul, it desperately needs a victory to increase confidence in the military and in the government. In the mean time, a coalition comprised of Gulf and Western powers has a significant role to play that will involve land deployments. 

To disrupt IS’ operations until Iraqi and Syrian forces are able to defeat them in conventional warfare, coalition forces should make extensive use of special forces as well as embedded forward air controllers and combat advisors. Simultaneously, the broader audience should be considered: the coalition should militarise media so as to convey a counter-narrative to that of IS. Currently, the Islamic State is able to make use of its high mobility to maintain the illusion of territorial acquisition: when it makes a loss in one place, it launches a highly publicised assault in another. Local conventional media and the Internet may be harnessed in order to disrupt this narrative, reducing the appeal of IS to foreign fighters.

The Islamic State cannot be seen as an independent issue in the Middle East. It is a problem intimately linked to a huge range of other geopolitical issues. It is complicated by the conflicting interests of the Gulf states and Iran, the tension between Turkey and the Gulf states, and by sectarian conflict, violent or otherwise, not just in Iraq and Syria, but in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. More evidently, the on-going Syrian civil war and the uncertainty that it generates complicate any response to IS, as does the collapse of the region’s geopolitical boundaries.

There is no simple policy prescription that will now resolve the problem of the Islamic State, and no plan made now will last to its ultimate destruction. However, a plan is better than no plan, and the coalition currently has no plan. Continuing airstrikes and training a trifling number of Iraqi and Syrian troops is not a plan, but an appeasement of domestic calls that something should be done. If it is to defeat the Islamic State, the coalition must have a strategy. The strategy that I outline will be painful to execute, but ultimately less painful than defeat.